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Women and the Free Exercise Clause: 
Some Thoughts About a (Religious) Feminist Reading 
Marie A. Failinger*
Among the dozens of Supreme Court cases on the free exercise of 
religion, women play a mostly invisible part. We know of Adell Sherbert1
and Frieda Yoder;2 and less famously, Alma Lovell,3 Lillian Gobitis,4 Paula 
Hobbie,5 Sarah Prince,6 and Lucie McClure.7 We know that these women 
go out into the streets to tell the Good News, refuse to salute idols, refuse to 
work on the Sabbath, and refuse to go to school in violation of their 
religion. But, we do not hear their voices very loudly. 
At the same time, until recently, we have consistently heard only one 
woman’s voice among the United States Supreme Court Justices who 
propound on what the Free Exercise Clause, and related statutes,8 require 
from the states in the protection of religious freedom. Justice O’Connor, the 
woman who served longest on the Court, has certainly made her mark on 
Religion Clause jurisprudence, though primarily in the Establishment 
Clause area—one powerful exception is her concurrence in Employment
Division v. Smith.9 Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, coming more 
recently to the religious freedom conversation, have also contributed 
*  Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law and former Editor-in-Chief of the Journal 
of Law and Religion. 
1  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
2  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
3  Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
4  Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
5  Hobbie v. Unemp’t Comp. Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
6  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
7  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Cheryl Perich, at the center of one of the 
most recent important Free Exercise cases, was not making a Free Exercise claim. Rather, she was 
arguing, with the EEOC, that Hosanna Tabor Lutheran Church and School could not make the Free 
Exercise argument that, since she was a “minister,” the court did not have jurisdiction to hear her 
Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Siding with the Church, the Supreme Court recognized the 
existence of a “ministerial exception” under the Free Exercise Clause for disability discrimination 
claims, and held that under the church’s teachings, her position fell within that exception. See Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). For more on the 
theological complexity of this conflict, see Marie A. Failinger, Lutheran and Yet Not Lutheran: A 
Church School Tests the Dilemma of Church and State, LXXXV THE CRESSET 19 (2012). 
8  Congress has supplemented the Free Exercise Clause with religious freedom protections in the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2001), and the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000c-5 (2000). 
9  494 U.S. 872, 906 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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important insights, again primarily in non-Free Exercise cases,10 but how 
these newer Justices will shape their own Free Exercise jurisprudence is not 
as clear. 
Yet, even in the early stages of jurisprudential development for these 
Justices, it might be helpful to ask whether we are hearing “a woman’s 
voice” in either the litigants before the Court or the women Justices who 
write opinions about these cases. And, we might wonder whether there are 
distinct themes that might characterize a “woman’s voice.” As we move 
into theory, I will suggest that there may even be a religious feminist voice 
that provides a set of values that would help us fruitfully explicate the Free 
Exercise Clause. It goes without saying that talking of a “woman’s” or 
“feminist” voice, or even a “religious feminist” voice, already essentializes 
a luxurious diversity of women’s voices and opinions about the troubling 
issues that confront judges attempting to find a faithful reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, I believe that not exploring what such a 
voice might sound like risks too easy acceptance of the existing readings of 
Free Exercise. They have been largely constructed from a secular 
imagination, and by male judges and male litigants, about what is at stake in 
Free Exercise jurisprudence. Therefore, they do not represent the important 
diversity of expression about how robust Free Exercise protection might 
contribute to the flourishing of a pluralistic, but flawed, democratic culture. 
In speaking of a religious feminist voice, I would make an initial 
response to the likely critique that a religious feminist voice is too 
particularist, to borrow Professor Shachar’s term, because it fails to 
embrace the experience and commitments of secular feminists and 
secularists as a whole.11 If secular feminists cannot (or choose not to) 
experience the Divine, whom many religious feminists argue is at the center 
of their lives, perhaps a religious feminist reading of the “secular” 
Constitution is more than just problematical on Establishment Clause 
grounds. One might argue that following such a voice not only excludes 
half of humanity, but ignores the ethical and philosophical voices of many 
women over the centuries who do not profess a religious commitment as 
well. 
There are at least three kinds of responses to this concern, none of 
them “sure winners” foreclosing all debate about whether a religious 
feminist reading is valuable or defensible. All of these responses, however, 
are strong enough to justify at least an initial exploration of religious 
10 See discussion infra notes 103–16. 
11  I borrow the term “particularist” from Ayelet Shachar, who in Multicultural Jurisdictions used 
the term “religious particularist” to refer to a sovereignty model in which religious communities would 
be delegated jurisdiction over certain matters, usually in family law. AYELET SHACHAR, MULTI-
CULTURAL JURISDICTIONS 72–78 (2001). 
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feminist themes. First, even if it were true that religious feminism has 
distinctive understandings and commitments that exclude those of secular 
feminists, to embrace secular feminist arguments as the “default” feminist 
approach also excludes important voices in a powerful way. Most of the 
world’s women are still religious,12 and their experience must be accounted 
for, if any jurisprudence is to embrace women’s real experiences and 
challenges.
Second, theologies that embrace natural law theory, such as the three 
western monotheistic traditions (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity), would 
argue that the moral commitments religious feminism proposes can be 
tested by all people, regardless of their faith commitments, through reason 
and experience.13 Theologically, they would argue that God the Creator has 
“written on our hearts,” imprinted on us from the moment of our creation, 
the ethical values and demands that God makes of us for life in this world.14
In these traditions, even the atheist who rejects the existence of God is 
already infused with the knowledge of right and wrong, and the innate 
12  For information on current religious affiliations in the world, see, for example, Pew Forum on 
Religion & Public Life, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050:
Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World’s 
Population (Apr. 2, 2015), www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050 (noting that 
while the worldwide religiously unaffiliated population is expected to grow in absolute numbers from 1.
1 billion to 1.2 billion from 2010–2050, its percentage of the population is projected to decline from 
sixteen percent to thirteen percent). In the United States, women claim to be more religious as a group 
than men. See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, America’s Changing Religious Landscape: 
Christians Decline Sharply as Share of Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow
(May 12, 2015), www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape (noting the fact 
that while the percentage of American women who describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated is 
growing at the same rate of men, only nineteen percent claim to be religiously unaffiliated as compared 
with twenty-seven percent of men who describe themselves that way). 
13  For samples of natural law arguments from Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that all persons 
can discover moral truths through reason, see, for example, JOHANNES HECKEL, A JURISTIC
DISQUISITION ON LAW IN THE THEOLOGY OF MARTIN LUTHER 55–56 (2010) (noting that God’s mercy 
“left man an inborn notion of what is law . . . . This is natural man’s divine ‘dowry’ which makes him 
aware of what is right and moral . . . .”); Anver Emon, Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law,
20 J.L. & RELIGION, 351, 359, 362 (2004–05) (noting that the Mu’tazilite school held that “one can 
move from empirical investigations of benefits and harms to a determination of divine obligation” and 
that “[t]he capacity to make moral judgments is a natural endowment of human beings, or what al-
Juwayni called the haqq al-adamiyyin”); Nahum Rakover, Jewish Law and the Noahide Obligation to 
Preserve Social Order, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1073 (1991) (explaining how the Noahide laws govern all 
of humanity and how five of those commandments—namely, “theft, sexual offenses, idolatry, 
blasphemy, and bloodshed” are discoverable by logic and rational reasoning). 
14 Romans 2:15 (ISV) (“They show that what the Law requires is written in their hearts, a fact to 
which their own consciences testify, and their thoughts will either accuse or excuse them.”); see also
Peter Judson Richards, The Law “Written in Their Hearts”?: Rutherford and Locke on Nature, 
Government and Resistance, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 151, 169 (2002–03) (quoting JOHN RUTHERFORD,
LEX, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE (1982) (noting that “even ‘heathens have, by instinct of nature, 
both made laws morally good, submitted to them, and set kings and judges over them, which clearly 
proveth that men have an active power of government by nature’”). 
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ability to understand how he or she must live with his or her neighbor.15
Finally, in the spirit of Rawls’ “overlapping consensus” theory,16 if we 
discover that religious feminism shares common cause with the arguments 
of secular feminism, the provenance or origins of those values should not 
cast suspicion over their validity; these are claims that can be embraced as 
consonant with the secular jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause. 
I. WHAT WOULD CHARACTERIZE A RELIGIOUS FEMINIST’S
READING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE?
Philosophical roadmaps attempting to describe the “different voice” 
spoken by women, particularly feminists, have highlighted important 
contrasting themes in traditional (sometimes called “patriarchal”) versus 
feminist approaches to difficult ethical or jurisprudential choices. Among 
these values has been the feminist emphasis on inclusivity and embrace of 
difference as a challenge to patriarchal ethical or legal systems that exclude 
groups from political and social participation or respect because of their 
innate differences or their religious or philosophical dissent from 
majoritarian culture or values.17 A second value is contextualism: feminists 
emphasize that ethical and legal judgments should be made in full 
awareness and embrace of the context of cases.18 They have largely rejected 
mechanical application of abstract rules to situations that are roughly 
equivalent in order to achieve justice, an approach which prioritizes 
regularity, predictability, and equal treatment. One specific contextual 
15 See, e.g., George W. Forell, Is There Lutheran Ethical Discourse?, 15 WORD AND WORLD, no.
1, 1994–95, at 4 (noting that atheists and non-Christians have God’s law written on their hearts and may 
cooperate in achieving the common good on this earth). 
16 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 233, 235–36 (1989). Rawls notes “the fact that a diversity of comprehensive doctrines is a 
permanent feature of a society with free institutions, and that this diversity can be overcome only by the 
oppressive use of state power—calls for explanation.” Of course, in justifying the use of overlapping 
consensus, Rawls assumes that “reasonable disagreement is disagreement between reasonable persons, 
that is, between persons who have realized their two moral powers to a degree sufficient to be free and 
equal citizens in a democratic regime, and who have an enduring desire to be fully cooperating members 
of society over a complete life. We assume such persons share a common human reason, similar powers 
of thought and judgment, a capacity to draw inferences and to weigh evidence and to balance competing 
considerations, and the like.” Id. While some would argue that religious claims do not meet such criteria, 
most mainstream religionists would disagree. 
17 CHERYL PRESTON, DECONSTRUCTING EQUALITY IN RELIGION, FEMINISM, LAW, AND 
RELIGION 27 (Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schiltz & Susan J. Stabile eds., 2014); see generally
NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 10, 12 (2006).
18 See LEVIT AND VERCHICK, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that feminist legal theorists are “drawn 
together by the methodologies they use, such as consciousness-raising . . . unmasking patriarchy, the use 
of stories and the political implications of personal experiences, an emphasis on voices not represented 
in the dominant tradition, contextual reasoning that focuses on particulars of experience, and asking 
questions about the gendered impact of policies or laws”). 
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theme is the importance of starting from the realities of women’s 
experience,19 and working toward ethical or other judgments “from the 
ground up,” rather than starting from an abstract ideal, even a feminist one, 
and “working down” toward a determination of a just result. 
A third similarly related theme in feminist theory is to emphasize 
relationality in ethical and jurisprudential decisions. Rather than conceiving 
of the human in her basic essence and existence as autonomous and 
unencumbered by the needs and demands of others, feminist theory 
understands the human person as essentially and existentially related to 
others. This feminist theme posits that the essence of a human being cannot 
be understood except as she is connected to others.20 Some feminists, like 
Robin West, have argued that women are connected in a unique and 
undeniable way to others as a result of their ability to birth children.21 A 
final theme feminist theory emphasizes is the importance of moving women 
from positions of subordination to men toward relationships of equality. 
Feminists differ, however, on what this means: some feminists understand 
that goal as women’s empowerment or self-determination,22 while others 
ask this question through the lens of complementarity or reciprocity 
between men and women.23
Religious feminists might call for a somewhat different, more 
complex, lens in describing an authentic experience of human existence that 
has at its core a relationship with the Divine. We might express the 
religious feminist experience, and the ethics and jurisprudence flowing 
from it, as reflecting five relational values: gratitude, humility, compassion, 
generosity, and integrity.24 This is not an exhaustive list of values we might 
19 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4–5 (2003) 
(describing feminist scholarship’s grounding in women’s experience). As an example, Clare Dalton has 
explained that feminism is “the range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated first, to describing
women’s subordination—exploring its nature and extent; dedicated second to asking how—through
what mechanism, and why—for what complex and interwoven reasons—women continue to occupy that 
position; and dedicated third, to change.” Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation 
of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
20  CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 58–59 (describing West’s argument as an emphasis on 
attachment, responsibility to others, empathy and relationships). 
21 Id. at 58. But see the critique of West’s theory, id. at 83–84, for its exclusion of lesbian 
relationships.
22 See PRESTON, supra note 17, at 27 (describing feminism as “allowing each woman to identify 
and define herself socially, economically and politically without external obstacles . . . . It is permitting 
choice, then valuing and respecting choices women make, at least to the extent choice is permitted and 
respected for men in society”). 
23 See, e.g., ELIZABETH R. SCHILTZ, A CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC THEORY OF 
COMPLEMENTARITY, FEMINISM, LAW, AND RELIGION 27 (Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schiltz & 
Susan J. Stabile eds., 2014). 
24  Some will recognize these values as a partial list of the virtues recognized in both ancient 
Greek and Roman, and later Christian and other thought. See ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL
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want to see in a jurisprudence of human flourishing—virtue theorists will 
recognize the absence of traditional virtues such as courage, temperance, 
kindness, and justice.25 But, I want to highlight those values that are 
especially associated with religious feminist thought and are especially 
neglected in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause. 
As we go down this road of describing a feminist lens on the Free 
Exercise Clause, we must fully acknowledge another fact of life that most 
religious traditions recognize: humans and human experience reflect both 
good and evil. In many traditions, ethics, and indeed jurisprudence, must at 
their core be a reflection on the tug of war between these values/virtues and 
their opposites: against gratitude, envy, or self-absorption; against humility, 
pride; against compassion, mercilessness; against generosity, hoarding; and 
against integrity, inconstancy, or infidelity.26
Turning to the values especially characteristic of a religious feminist 
approach, religious women would argue that an authentic experience of the 
world necessarily engenders the response of gratitude. Even the human 
person who is most entrapped in her physical limitations (the disabled, the 
prisoner) and social constraints (the untouchable, the abused) has received 
the gift of life in all of its complexity. The Alzheimer’s patient or the 
quadriplegic can still experience joy and love and hope, as well as all that 
the five senses—sight, sound, touch, smell, taste—have to offer as we move 
through our lives. Even the emotionally abused and the socially degraded 
person can go through life experiencing much, or most, of it as a horizon in 
which many of those interactions that give life meaning are possible. For 
example, one might argue that envying the material goods that one does not 
have, or the social possibilities that one’s life has not offered, falsifies one’s 
own existence. That envy is false not only because it ignores those goods 
and experiences an individual person does have, but it also pretends that 
these things out of reach are a necessary part of creating one’s own 
authentic life. 
TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES: THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1–3 (Catherine 
Temerson trans., 2001); STANLEY HAUERWAS & CHARLES PINCHES, CHRISTIANS AMONG THE VIRTUES:
THEOLOGICAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ANCIENT AND MODERN ETHICS 23 (2002) [hereinafter 
HAUERWAS & PINCHES]. However, I eschew the use of the word “virtue” to avoid the implication that 
these are qualities to be achieved by the self-willed striving of the individual, as the ancient Greeks 
would understand a virtue. Rather, with feminist epistemology, I understand these values as proceeding 
out of a true understanding of the nature of human life as relational. See id. 
25 See, e.g., HAUERWAS & PINCHES, supra note 24, at 20 (describing Plato’s list of cardinal 
virtues of courage, temperance, justice and wisdom; and Aristotle’s list that includes generosity, 
magnificence, high-mindedness, gentleness, truthfulness, wittiness, friendship, shame and “a nameless 
virtue between ambition and lack of ambition”). 
26 Id. at 20. 
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Women in the monotheistic religions would argue that all of these 
good things, which constitute our individual lives, are blessings from the 
Divine, and the only true response to such blessings is gratitude.27 For a 
religious person, gratitude is a two-fold response. First, it is realism: it tells 
how things really are, by giving proper acknowledgement of the source and 
giver of these blessings, as well as the blessings themselves.28 Second, it 
recognizes that the only truly human response in a situation in which full 
reciprocity is not possible because of the vast imbalance between giver and 
recipient is gratitude—gratitude is a reaching out to the giver that 
acknowledges not only the gift given, but also how the recipient 
experiences that gift.29 In the Western monotheistic traditions, that 
experience of gratitude and awe is captured in the Psalmist’s 
acknowledgement, “I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully 
made; your works are wonderful, I know that full well.”30
That same experience of each person’s relationship with the Creator 
and the created world around her also engenders a necessary response of 
humility. To see the world truly requires one not only to understand the 
fullness of human existence and the capacity that lies within each person 
over a lifetime, but also the limitations built into any one person’s possible 
life-course, or any one community’s history.31 The monotheistic traditions, 
among others, demand recognition that we humans are not only creators, 
but also creatures. Our creatureliness carries with it the baggage of physical 
limitations: within this skin, we can only see so much, carry so much, learn 
so much. But perhaps even more significantly, we must contend with the 
moral limitations: we will fail more often than we succeed in being 
everything our neighbor needs.32 In the Christian tradition in which I 
learned these values, we acknowledge that this moral limitation is not only 
due to our creatureliness—our inability to understand and to act—but also 
our willful refusal to understand and to do what our neighbor requires.33
27 Id. at 121. 
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Psalm 139:14 (NIV). 
31 See HAUERWAS & PINCHES, supra note 24, at 47 (discussing the way in which we learn that 
no man is an island, and the importance of a community of friends). 
32  See DOROTHEE SOELLE & SHIRLEY A. CLOYES, TO WORK AND TO LOVE: A THEOLOGY OF 
CREATION 29 (1984) (“My choices are limited by virtue of my being made from dust. And the 
theological question that ensues is: Can I affirm myself as one who is made from dust? Can I say that 
my having been created is very good? How do I, as a person made from dust, respond to the ontological 
project of being created for freedom . . . . Is it possible for me to value my ‘creatureliness’ in the 
knowledge that my existence was willed prior to my birth, that I am not here on this earth simply by 
chance, that I am needed, that I am not a disposable object, and that I am designed for freedom and 
equality?”).
33 See Marc Kolden, Work and Meaning: Some Theological Reflections, 48 INTERPRETATION
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Whether to recognize that humility is a feminist value has been a 
source of great contention in feminist thought. Some have suggested that 
humility is to women what pride is to men—that is, women’s greatest sin is 
to belittle and erase their own selves, violating the essential value of respect 
for all persons.34 Others have argued that women’s humility is a harmful 
consequence of centuries of subordination, the greatest emotional damage 
done to women, which can only be rectified by empowering women toward 
independence as autonomous selves.35
However, humility, understood rightly, is “not a lack of awareness; it 
is the extreme awareness of the limits of all virtue and one’s own limits as 
well . . . [it] is not contempt for oneself” or “the flip side of a kind of self-
hatred . . . [r]emorse, bad conscience, or shame.”36 It is rather “the effort 
through which the self attempts to free itself of its illusions about itself” and 
becomes “exposed to love and to the light.”37 For women, humility exposes 
the illusion that we can do everything, and be everything, for those whom 
we love and we care for; humility helps us find a realistic balance between 
our power and our powerlessness, our love and its limitations, our strength 
and our weakness. Ana Novoa argues, “Humility of course is truth. 
Humility recognizes strength and giftedness, and further recognizes those 
and all other attributes as gifts. It is our responsibility in humility to accept, 
honor, affirm and use the ways in which we are gifted.”38
Third, the values of generosity and compassion go hand in hand in a 
religious feminist jurisprudence. Compassion is the understanding that 
precedes generosity. It is to choose to participate, intellectually and 
emotionally, in the experience of others, particularly the suffering of 
others.39 It is to “refuse[] to regard any suffering as a matter of indifference 
or any living being as a thing . . . [it] is the opposite of cruelty, which 
rejoices in the suffering of others, and of egoism, which is indifferent to that 
262, 263 (1994). 
34 See Joy Ann McDougal, Sin-No More? A Feminist Re-Visioning of a Christian Theology of 
Sin, 88 ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REV. 215 (2006). 
35 See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Rhymes with Rich: Power, Law and the Bitch, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 281, 287 (2009) (quoting Professor Susan Estrich’s description of the bargain women have struck 
to be submissive, due to “a lifetime of learned behavior resulting in gender-determined beliefs that 
power, control, and authority are inherently masculine qualities, while humility, docility, and 
compliance embody desirable feminine traits”). 
36  COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 140, 145. 
37 Id. at 147. Comte-Sponville cleverly, and perhaps ironically, argues that a truly humble person 
would be led to atheism, since “[h]umanity makes for such a pathetic creation: how can we believe a 
God could have wanted this?” Id. (emphasis in original). 
38  Ana Novoa, Lessons from La Morenita Del Tepeyac, 20 J.L. & RELIGION 267, 290 n.123 
(2004–05) (distinguishing humility from subservience). 
39 COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 105. 
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suffering.”40
Such participation in the life of the Other is complex, and in conditions 
of sin,41 cautionary instructions are important. In a perfect world, perhaps, 
compassion would be characterized by the emptying of one’s own 
experience and commitments to embrace the experience of the Other, a way 
of walking in solidarity through his pain. In conditions of sin, however, 
compassion can be easily distorted: as finite human beings, we can 
misunderstand the experience of the Other, or unconsciously substitute our 
own experience, which is more accessible to each of us, for the experience 
of the Other. When we mistake egoism for compassion, we can impose 
upon the Other assumptions and actions that are, at best, disrespectful to 
that person’s authentic self, and at worst, downright harmful. A perhaps 
helpful corrective is to temper compassion with self-reflection on the 
human experience of solidarity, i.e., the realization that we are in fact 
interdependent, that there is self-interest in our care for the other, just as the 
Other has an interest in reciprocating our care.42 Yet, solidarity, unless it is 
truly universally conceived, is also limiting: if we act solely out of 
solidarity, then we will not extend our recognition of suffering to those 
whose interests seem more remote to our own interests and goals, e.g., 
those who are geographically or socially distant, or politically or 
economically at odds with us.43
Generosity responds to this experiencing of the Other’s pain with 
action. Comte-Sponville distinguishes generosity, this “virtue of giving,” 
from the virtue of justice: in doing justice, we give every person his or her 
own due.44 In enacting generosity, we give a person not what is rightly his 
or hers, but what is rightly ours as earthly justice conceives it.45 (For 
Christians and many other religious believers, of course, nothing is “rightly 
ours” as human justice would calculate since everything comes from the 
generosity of the Creator.)46 A different relational dynamic also attends our 
40  Id. at 106. 
41  Christians recognize that human existence is marked by human sin as well as goodness. 
Theologically, it is “the substitution of some other reality for God, the placing of oneself or some 
created thing where God alone should stand.” In Christian theology, sin also encompasses “the state of 
alleged independence, of asserted self-sufficiency” and “of that ‘hardness of heart’ that lasts, the ears 
that will not hear and the eyes that will not see” the “claims and prerogatives of God.” TIMOTHY F.
O’CONNELL, PRINCIPLES FOR A CATHOLIC MORALITY 68–69 (1978). 
42  COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 88–89. 
43 See id. at 88. 
44 See id. at 86. 
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Ronald Duty, The Right to Property and Daily Bread: Thinking with Luther About 
Human Economic Rights, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS (Feb. 1, 2009), www.elca.org/JLE/Articles/408 
(Luther’s theology “presumes that God gives these things abundantly for all, not that they are inherently 
scarce and available only for some. It assumes that there is a holistic relationship between individuals, 
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acting justly versus our acting generously. Comte-Sponville argues that 
“generosity is more subjective, more individual, more affective and more 
spontaneous, while justice . . . is always somewhat more objective, more 
universal, more intellectual and more considered.”47
Finally, a religious feminist jurisprudence would require the embrace 
of integrity with its twin, fidelity.48 For a religious feminist, the concept of 
integrity goes beyond the common definitions. Integrity does not simply 
mean the opposite of dishonesty, or even the notion that one’s life-course 
demonstrates an “integral whole,” that one is faithful to one’s own self-
conception.49 Rather, integrity means the constancy in one’s own character 
that is constituted by and reflected in constancy to others50 and, for religious 
people, to God. To be faithful means to “admit to being the same, because I 
take the responsibility of a certain past as my own, and because I intend to 
recognize my present commitment[s] as still my own in the future.”51 To be 
valuable, one’s integrity, the fidelity to self and to others that flows from it, 
must be directed toward a good value—for example, faithfulness to the 
truth, faithfulness to “the historicity of a value, to an always particular 
presence within us of the past, whether it be the collective past of 
humanity . . . or a more individual past, our own or that of our parent.”52
Fidelity embraces the promise to be constant as a person who [shows] 
faithfulness in loving one’s neighbor as one is able. 
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION
 With this introduction to the themes that might characterize the 
interpretive commitments of a religious feminist reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause, we might explore whether women plaintiffs in the Court’s 
Free Exercise cases have lived out, or been judged by a religious feminist-
informed vision of the Constitution. Because it is especially hard to hear the 
voice of most of these women in the pages of the U.S. Reports, our task 
must be primarily speculative and imaginative. 
God, and others in a human community that is both mutually responsive and mutually responsible. His 
view of daily bread also presumes that there is a natural mutual dependence of human beings on God 
and each other for the things needed for human life. Furthermore, it sees human life and whatever is 
needed to sustain it as a gift of God and therefore as good.”). 
47  COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 87. 
48 See, e.g., Clea F. Fees & Jonathan Webber, Constancy, Fidelity, and Integrity, in THE
HANDBOOK OF VIRTUE ETHICS 35 (Stan van Hooft & Nicole Saunders eds., 2013) (describing the 
virtues of constancy, fidelity, and integrity as forming a cluster of traits that are orientations toward 
personal commitments). 
49 See id. at 14–15. 
50 Id. at 15–16. 
51 COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 21. 
52  Id. at 22, 23, 25. 
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We might start with the zealous proselytizer about which we know the 
most, Sarah Prince. Reviewing her case with the precious few facts we 
have, we might speculate that Sarah Prince perhaps understood the values at 
the heart of a religious feminist expression of the Constitution at least a 
little better than law enforcement. Sarah was criminally accused of violating 
Massachusetts’ child labor laws by bringing her niece, nine-year-old Betty 
Simmons, onto a street corner with her to distribute publications of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.53 In one reading of the facts, Prince was perhaps 
arrested simply for repeatedly disobeying the school attendance officer’s 
attempts to stop her from bringing Betty with her to hand out these 
magazines.54 It is also possible to wonder, against the background of this 
period, if the Prince case is one of the many involving the persecution of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses simply because they were “troublesome” religious 
dissenters.55
But, even reading this case in the best light for the prosecution, neither 
Prince’s arrest, nor the Supreme Court’s subsequent affirmance suggests 
anything but a formulaic application of the law to these cases, a clear 
precursor to Justice Scalia’s call in Employment Division v. Smith for
uniform application above all else.56 The context for Prince’s arrest was a 
far cry from the conditions that gave rise to the Massachusetts child labor 
laws. Betty was handing out two religious magazines for what her magazine 
bag advertised as a contribution of five cents apiece.57 She was in company 
of her guardian, who was standing on the street corner twenty feet away 
from Sarah.58 The local authorities could clearly see Betty was not a 
“newsie” running the streets, nor a young girl alone in danger of being 
assaulted by strangers.59 Nor was her aunt a depraved capitalist exploiting 
child labor so she did not have to pay her adult workers a fair wage, another 
impetus for the anti-child labor movement.60 Betty herself testified that, 
53  Commonwealth v. Prince, 46 N.E.2d 755, 755 (Mass. 1943). 
54 See Appellant’s Brief at 7, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (No. 98), 1943 WL 
54417, at *7 (noting that “Perkins reminded Mrs. Prince that he had warned her about a year previous 
concerning her permitting her two sons, Donald and William, to engage in the ‘selling’ of ‘the 
magazines.’ He also told her that on a prior occasion he had discussed the law with her and even let her 
read the law. He also said he had written a letter to her explaining the law.”) (citations omitted). 
55 See Chuck E. Smith, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 547 (2001) (reviewing SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS,
JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2000)). 
56 See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 885 (1990). 
57 Prince, 46 N.E.2d at 756. 
58 Id.
59  On the prevalence and hazards of night work by children before child labor legislation was 
passed, see Marie A, Failinger, Too Cheap for Anybody but Us: Toward a Theory and Practice of Good 
Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1035, 1058, 1063–64, 1076 (2004). 
60 Id. at 1056, 1066–67. 
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“she was doing this work because she loved the Lord and He commands us 
to do it. She declared that it was her way of worshiping Almighty God.”61
The all-male Supreme Court, even without knowing Sarah or Betty, or 
the full context in which Betty was being raised, also rejects her claim, 
positing a hypothetical parade of horribles that they believed justified 
criminalization of Prince’s activity. Like the authorities below, their view of 
what was at stake for Betty Simmons does not seem at all related to the 
actual facts of the case: 
The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propa-
gandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other 
matters, may, and at times does, create situations difficult enough for 
adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of 
tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of 
emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury. Parents 
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they 
can make that choice for themselves.62
In this passage, the Court reiterates two assumptions of the traditional 
view of rights that do not square with the feminist approach. First, they 
assume adult rights-holders are autonomous citizens who are properly 
empowered to make even foolish “martyr” choices about what is in their 
own best interest. Second, they assume that young women and girls are too 
emotionally and physically fragile to engage in public life: street 
proselytization, even with loving supervision, can lead to “emotional 
excitement, and psychological or physical injury.”63
The Court’s analysis betrays an unwillingness to exercise compassion 
or humility—the Justices are unwilling to put themselves in the shoes of a 
religionist engaging in activity that they simply do not understand except 
through the abstract lens of child abuse or neglect. The Justices also cannot 
seem to acknowledge that they really do not know whether Sarah Prince 
accurately claims that her family’s street proselytization is essential to her 
niece’s salvation. The opinion treats “martyrdom” (an excessive word for 
street proselytization, to be sure) as a personal idiosyncrasy of a zealot 
rather than as a possible call to duty from the Divine. Ironically, the Court 
61 Id.
62 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (U.S. 1944). 
63  Alma Lovell, who went alone but with the same goals, won her case, arguing that seeking 
prior approval from secular authority for distributing the Good News would violate her faith, though 
under the Press Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448 
(1938). It is not clear whether the Court thought that Lovell, an adult woman, was more capable of 
making a “martyr” choice, or simply more entitled under the Constitution to do so. 
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reaches this conclusion despite its glancing recognition that something 
important may indeed be at stake for Betty: “The other freedom is the 
child’s, to observe these [tenets], and among them is ‘to preach the 
gospel . . . by public distribution of “Watchtower” and “Consolation,” in 
conformity with the scripture: “A little child shall lead them.”‘“64
In these circumstances, the Court could easily have carefully crafted an 
exception or distinguished this case on several grounds from the 
paradigmatic cases for which the child labor laws were passed. Sarah Prince 
was not an exploiting employer sending her charges out into the dangers of 
the night street; she was a watchful supervisor of the children in her care. 
Hers was not a commercial, but a religious venture. But, in the Court’s 
desire to elevate the abstract principle, the demand for uniformity in the 
face of contextual difference, the Court would not carve out such an 
exception.65
By contrast, though we cannot be sure from the scant facts we have, 
Sarah’s behavior seems to better mimic the values of religious feminist 
thought. Sarah, Betty’s custodian, has accepted the responsibility for her 
niece’s religious education and spiritual welfare; and far from attempting to 
exploit her labor for gain, she risks arrest to engage her niece in those 
activities she understands as critical to her niece’s religious education and 
salvation.66 As Sarah understands the situation, Betty is simply carrying out 
the Lord’s commands to preach the Gospel to every person.67 As such, 
Sarah is likely exercising the virtue of gratitude—she understands that her 
religious calling to tell the Good News is responsive to the gifts that God 
has bestowed on Betty and her, most importantly the gift of everlasting life. 
She understands the Divine charge given to her to care for Betty, neither 
leaving Betty alone at home, nor leaving Betty alone to care for her own 
spiritual health. Instead, Sarah engages Betty in the work that, as Sarah 
understands it, is life giving for Betty.68
64 Prince, 321 U.S. at 164. 
65 See id. at 170 (citing with approval Massachusetts’ decision that “an absolute prohibition, 
though one limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to 
accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral 
instances in which the parent’s supervision may reduce but cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the 
prohibited conduct.”). 
66  Again, in conditions of sin, we have to recognize that the converse may be true—perhaps 
Sarah’s “compassion” for Betty’s welfare was nothing more than the imposition of her own beliefs and 
understanding of Betty’s spiritual situation, as the Court implies, and Betty’s coercion into “martyrdom” 
in service of Sarah’s own commitments. 
67 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 162. 
68  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 54, at 4–6 (noting in several places that distribution of the 
literature was God’s command). Some describe Jehovah’s Witnesses beliefs as that “a person must 
manifest his faith in the manner Christ did by dedicating himself to Jehovah God, symbolizing that 
dedication by water immersion, and making public proclamation of the truth. He must be a teacher of 
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What the constable assumes to be sheer stubbornness, the refusal to 
obey his authority after he repeatedly attempts to get Sarah Prince to stop 
bringing children with her, might instead be an exercise in integrity. Even at 
the risk of arrest, Sarah chooses fidelity in her relationship to Betty and 
Betty’s well-being; she chooses to “walk the talk” by teaching Betty in her 
deeds as well as her words that faithfulness to the commands of God is the 
highest form of fidelity. Her work provides a witness to her niece Betty that 
the reward for obedience to the Divine transcends even the comforts of this 
life that attend conformity to the expectations of the powerful, the 
authorities.
Indeed, there is some argument that Sarah herself is not simply a 
willful, aberrant zealot, but a citizen who is exercising the virtues of 
compassion and generosity for the public. Sarah explains that she and Betty 
hand out these religious messages “[f]or no other reason . . . but to tell the 
people of the one place of safety, that is in the kingdom of God under Christ 
that we prayed for.”69 For Sarah, the street is her church, the place where 
she and her niece are called in obedience to God’s design for salvation for 
the whole world. Sarah’s faith compels her to preach this good news to 
unbelievers, and to train her niece to do so. That this is a central tenet of her 
faith, the Court is not able to deny, but also does not choose to respect.70
Alma Lovell makes a similar powerful testimony about her respon-
sibility to those unbelievers she is encountering on the street: 
We bring to the people the proofs that the time is at hand for the 
establishment of the kingdom of Jehovah God. The present disturbed 
condition of the nations, with the perplexity and distress prevailing 
among the people, are among the evidences that Satan’s rule over the 
earth is nearing its end, and will be followed by God’s kingdom which 
will bring righteousness and peace to all people who are willing to 
hear and obey Almighty God. I was doing this work in obedience to 
God’s law which says, “And this gospel of the kingdom shall be 
preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations: and then shall 
the end come.” Matthew 24:14. I am a Christian and have entered into 
God’s Word and purposes. He cannot remain silent, thinking that belief alone is sufficient for salvation. 
Silence is not God’s way to it.” Matt Slick, A Jehovah’s Witness Must Become Worthy of Salvation, 
CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS AND RESEARCH MINISTRY (Oct. 24, 2015), http://carm.org/religious-
movements/jehovahs-witnesses/jehovahs-witness-must-become-worthy-salvation. 
69  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 54, at 9. 
70  The United States Supreme Court in Prince notes, “The rights of children to exercise their 
religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious 
belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition 
here . . . .” Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. For more on the importance of evangelism for a Jehovah’s Witness,
see Fulfill Your Role as an Evangelizer, THE WATCHTOWER, May 15, 2013, www.jw.org/en/
publications/magazines/w20130515/successful-evangelizer.
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a covenant or agreement to do the will of God and obey His com-
mandments. Therefore it is incumbent upon me to obey His mandate to 
preach the gospel. “For necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me, 
if I preach not the gospel!”71
Even the Supreme Court recognizes Lovell’s belief that she “is sent by 
Jehovah to do His work,” and that to stop would be “an act of disobedience 
to His commandment.”72 The Court reluctantly concludes, using autonomy 
as its backdrop, that as an adult, Alma is constitutionally entitled to risk her 
safety or her good name by walking the streets to hand out literature. Lovell 
wins her case under the Press Clause, successfully arguing that seeking 
prior approval from secular authority for distributing the Good News would 
violate her faith.73
We might also look at the women in Free Exercise cases who were 
forced to choose between their faith and their family’s well-being. Perhaps 
the most famous female Free Exercise plaintiff, Adell Sherbert, was denied 
unemployment benefits because she refused to work on her Sabbath.74 The 
plant where she had worked for thirty-five years suddenly changed its work 
policy to require that employees be available for work on Saturdays.75 In 
this narrative, Sherbert, a relatively recent convert to the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church, which teaches that Christians are forbidden to work from 
sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, followed the demands of her religion 
and missed six work Saturdays.76
Sherbert, demonstrating a spirit of generosity and compassion, not 
only informed her supervisor of this conflict with her faith before missing 
work, to no avail, but also offered to be available for any work that would 
not require her to work Saturdays.77 Yet, the unemployment compensation 
agency refused to find her “available for work,” despite the fact that such 
work was likely available if they had only worked with her: over 150 other 
Adventists in the area were employed without incident in jobs not requiring 
Saturday work.78
By contrast to Adell Sherbert, the government enforcers of the South 
Carolina law rigidly refused to exercise the virtues of compassion and 
71  Appellant’s Brief at 4, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (No. 391) 1937 WL 
41018, at *4. 
72  Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448 (1938). 
73 Id.
74  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963). 
75 Id. at 399 n.1. 
76 Id.; Brief for the Appellant at 6, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (No. 526) 1963 WL 
105527, at *6. 
77  Brief for the Appellant, supra note 76, at 6. 
78 Id. at 7–10. 
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generosity. They refused to walk in Sherbert’s shoes and offer her an 
accommodation which would alleviate the harsh consequences to a blue 
collar factory worker of lost wages and lost unemployment compensation. 
Neither would they seriously consider whether providing an exception for 
Sherbert, given the context, would frustrate the law in fact. We may surmise 
that they rested their decision on their “slippery slope” worry that it would 
be hard to deny an exemption in other more difficult cases where 
religionists asked for exemptions. 
Paula Hobbie, also a recent Seventh Day Adventist convert, was 
similarly fired for refusing to work at her job as a jewelry store manager 
from Friday to Saturday.79 Once again in her case, the Court confronted an 
employer and an unemployment compensation agency that refused to 
compromise: while Hobbie’s supervisor worked out a schedule to permit 
Hobbie to exercise her faith and still remain employed, the general manager 
told her to be available for every shift or be fired. Despite this 
intransigence, the unemployment agency found that her refusal to work was 
“misconduct” that made her ineligible for benefits.80
In Sherbert and Hobbie, and the intervening case of Thomas v. 
Unemployment Division,81 the Supreme Court took a quite different 
approach than the Justices employed in the Prince case. Following the well-
known case of Sherbert v. Verner, which held sway in the Supreme Court 
for twenty-seven years, the Court in Thomas wrote:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a 
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial.82
Thus, both Sherbert and Thomas held that refusals to permit indivi-
duals to exercise their religious beliefs in their daily lives could be justified 
only by the State’s proof of a compelling interest. This constitutional turn of 
events could be explained in many ways—perhaps, like Lovell, the Court 
was simply recognizing Sherbert’s right to exercise her autonomy, or was 
concerned that the state was encroaching over the line between state and 
church. Yet, between Sherbert and Hobbie, another explanation is plausible. 
79  Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 130, 138 (1987). 
80 Id.
81  450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
82  Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (referring as 
precedent for this point to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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In Hobbie, the State attempted to factually (and incorrectly) distinguish 
Sherbert on the grounds that Hobbie had recently converted, which in the 
government’s view put the responsibility for causing the problem on her: 
“Hobbie was the ‘agent of change’ and is therefore responsible for the 
consequences of the conflict between her job and her religious beliefs.”83
Once again, in these cases, the government offered the “autonomous 
citizen” model as a paradigm for the Court—for the government, religion is 
a “choice” that one makes separately from family and friends, from history 
or tradition, from one’s other values and experiences. It is a “choice” for 
which the individual is “responsible” if it interferes with the rules of the 
market-based workaday world that are the presumed to be the proper 
standard for human experience. 
However, the Sherbert Court rejects this understanding of the role of 
religion in the life of the believer. Instead, under the Sherbert test, it is the 
government’s responsibility to exercise compassion—to walk in the shoes 
of Sherbert and Hobbie, to engage them in the context of their own 
religious understanding. Or at the least, the Court suggests, the state is 
required to respect the fact that these minority religionists might be refusing 
to work because of an authentic understanding of their own relationship 
with God and their employers, including their belief that, out of gratitude, 
they owed God their full engagement in praise and thanksgiving for one day 
out of the week. Sherbert v. Verner requires the government to see this 
expression of faith, and to consider whether there is any alternative way of 
meeting the state’s interest besides violating these women’s relationships 
with God. 
We know little of Frieda Yoder or Barbara Miller, two fifteen-year-old 
children of the father-defendants in Wisconsin v. Yoder.84 We do know that 
Frieda, alone among the Amish children, testified to her own belief in the 
Amish Christian tradition and way of life, and her desire to live according 
to its tenets.85 While the Yoders won their case through application of the 
Sherbert rule, it is important to note in Justice Douglas’ dissent some 
skepticism about whether the Amish children in this case were capable of 
making, and permitted to make, independent judgments about the wisdom 
of ending their public education. In Douglas’ view, “the inevitable effect [of 
giving the parents a choice regarding their children’s schooling] is to 
impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children.”86
83 Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 143. 
84 406 U.S. 205, 207 n.1 (1972). 
85 Id. at 237. 
86 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
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Douglas’ dissent embodies the ambivalence of judicial attempts to 
exercise humility about the courts’ understanding of the experiences and 
religious commitments of the litigants before them. On one hand, Douglas’ 
opinion seems to be a commendable attempt to bypass the opinions of state 
officials and the children’s fathers to understand the situation and 
commitments of the Amish children who were affected by this conflict, a 
conflict in which they were treated as bystanders rather than central actors. 
On the other hand, Justice Douglas has great difficulty actually 
foregoing the temptation to substitute his own experience and imagination 
for that of Frieda Yoder and Barbara Miller. While he grudgingly concedes 
that Frieda testified that she herself had rejected high school because of her 
own religious belief, he expresses skepticism about whether Barbara 
Miller’s or any other Amish child’s choice, is in fact the real choice of that 
child.87 Reiterating a tradition understanding that religion is an autonomous 
decision made by a separated individual—”religion is an individual 
experience.”88—he seems to reject as foolish the possibility that Frieda or 
Barbara can live the fullest lives possible to them as members of a close-
knit faith community that rejects material success and worldly education. In 
so doing, he rejects the value of integrity, the notion that a life lived in 
faithfulness to relationships that these children have formed with their 
family and community may be more intrinsically beneficial to all than a life 
in which these children “explore their full potential,” as an individualist 
understanding of democratic freedom might define it. 
Lillian Gobitis and Lucie McClure come to us almost as afterthoughts 
in the pages of the Supreme Court. Lillian, age twelve, was the older of two 
children expelled from a Minersville, Pennsylvania, public school in the 
Gobitis case, for refusing to salute the flag because they understood that it 
was forbidden by Exodus 20.89 The Witnesses described their refusal to 
salute as a theological necessity: 
To salute a flag means in effect that the person saluting the flag 
ascribes salvation and protection to the thing or power which the flag 
stands for and represents, and that since the flag and the government 
which it symbolizes are of the world and not of Jehovah God, it is 
wrong to salute the flag, and to do so denies the supremacy of 
Almighty God, and contravenes His express command as set forth in 
Holy Writ.90
87 Id. at 243. 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89  Respondent’s Brief at 5, Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690), 
1940 WL 46893, at *5. 
90 Id.
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Lucie was the third named plaintiff in the case that has come to be 
known as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, overturning 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gobitis, that a state could expel a child for 
failing to salute the flag, under the Speech Clause.91 The plaintiffs explained 
that:
[The Gobitis family members] are members of an unincorporated 
association of Christian people designated as Jehovah’s Witnesses; 
that each and every one of Jehovah’s Witnesses has entered into an 
agreement or covenant with Jehovah God, wherein they have 
consecrated themselves to do His will and to obey his commandments: 
they . . . believe that a failure to obey the precepts in the Bible will 
result in their eternal destruction.92
Once again, the Gobitis and Barnette plaintiffs recognize the 
importance of integrity understood as faithfulness to those with whom they 
are in relationship. On the one hand, they keep their covenant—their 
promise—to God and their religious community to give loyalty where it 
belongs. On the other, they are willing to acknowledge the lesser covenant 
they have as members of the political community. In both cases, these 
children stand “in respectful silence” while the non-Witness children 
saluted the flag. Moreover, the Barnette plaintiffs offered the state a 
patriotic pledge which would not compromise their religious beliefs while 
still respecting the state’s concern that the schools “are dealing with the 
formative period in the development in citizenship” and that teaching civic 
participation was an important part of the public school curriculum.93 That 
pledge read: 
I have pledged my unqualified allegiance and devotion to Jehovah, the 
Almighty God, and to His Kingdom, for which Jesus commands all 
Christians to pray. I respect the flag of the United States and 
acknowledge it as a symbol of freedom and justice to all. I pledge 
allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States that are 
consistent with God’s law, as set forth in the Bible.94
In Gobitis, the Witnesses also proved that their children “were always 
diligent to obey every rule of the school except the rule relating to the 
formal saluting of the flag” and that their community “willingly and 
diligently obey[s] all the laws of the state when such laws do not conflict 
91 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overturning Gobitis v. Minersville 
Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). 
92  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 89, at 4. 
93  Appellees’ Brief at 5, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591), 1943 
WL 71856, at *5. 
94 Id. at 8. 
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with the law of Almighty God.”95
Yet, the Witnesses’ pervasive showing of patriotic respect and offer to 
compromise with the state was met with stubborn resistance by state school 
officials: With no apparent sense of irony, in its resolution requiring salute 
of the flag, the West Virginia Board of Education began its edict by 
recognizing, 
[that] one’s convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and 
man’s relation to it [are] placed beyond the reach of law[;] . . . [that the 
p]ropagation of belief . . . is protected, whether in church or chapel, 
mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meeting house[; that the 
Constitutions of the United States and of the State 
of West Virginia assure] . . . generous immunity to the individual from 
imposition of penalty for offending, in the course of his own religious 
activities, the religious views of others, be they a minority or those 
who are dominant in the government.96
Nevertheless, the Board determined that it is “an act of insubordination” for 
children or their teachers to refuse to salute the flag, an “emblem of 
freedom in its truest, best sense . . . liberty regulated by law, protection of 
the weak against the strong.”97
As is well-known, the Supreme Court reversed Gobitis and the school 
expulsions in Barnette, giving us one of the grand summaries of American 
jurisprudence, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens 
to confess by word or act their faith therein.”98
What is not remembered is the way in which the Court, just before this 
stirring phrase, discounts and disrespects both the validity and the value of 
the dissent the Barnette children and their parents offered. 
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities 
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional 
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to 
others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too 
great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the 
95  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 89, at 4. 
96 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). 
97  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). 
98 Id. at 642. 
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existing order.99
We see in that paragraph the way in which the Court has grounded its 
Free Exercise jurisprudence in a conception of the individual as an 
autonomous (perhaps strange, perhaps odd) free thinker, a theme that 
surfaces in other cases like United States v. Seeger100 and Gillette v. United 
States.101 In this way, religious freedom is formulated as a means to protect 
freedom of (aberrant) thought, not as a way of nourishing foundational 
values necessary to a flourishing democratic society.102
III. THE VOICES OF THE WOMEN JUSTICES ON RELIGION AND THE STATE
We might also explore whether we hear a “different voice” in the 
opinions of the women Justices in Religion Clause cases, and if so, if the 
development of Religion Clause jurisprudence has been influenced by their 
presence on the Court. Although it is one of the newest cases by the newest 
Justice, and not a Free Exercise case, a discernible difference can be seen in 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, challenging the practice of sectarian prayer in 
the Town of Greece under the Establishment Clause.103 Justice Elena Kagan 
begins her dissenting opinion with three hypotheticals, all of them 
beginning with the invitation for the reader to put him or herself in the place 
of a minority religionist, by imagining that “[y]ou are” a litigant asked to 
pray before a trial, a voter asked to pray at the election booth, an immigrant 
asked to pray at a naturalization ceremony.104 Or, she asks, what if “you 
are” a Christian subjected to a Jewish or Muslim prayer in a public 
setting?105 Finally, she places “you,” the reader, into the very scenario 
raised in the case, extensively discussing the way in which the very context 
of the case imposes a hardship on religious dissenters. She asks the reader 
99 Id. at 641–42. 
100  United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
101 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1967). 
102 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986)). There, O’Connor adopts as a rationale for protecting Free Exercise, the 
Founders’ “shared . . . conviction that true religion and good morals are the only solid foundation of 
public liberty and happiness.” Id. at 564. 
103  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841–54 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 1842–43 (asking the reader to “[s]uppose, for example, that government officials in a 
predominantly Jewish community asked a rabbi to begin all public functions with a chanting of the 
Sh’ma and V’ahavta. (‘Hear O Israel! The Lord our God, the Lord is One . . . Bind [these words] as a 
sign upon your hand; let them be a symbol before your eyes; inscribe them on the doorposts of your 
house, and on your gates.’) Or assume officials in a mostly Muslim town requested a muezzin to 
commence such functions, over and over again, with a recitation of the Adhan. (‘God is greatest, God is 
greatest. I bear witness that there is no deity but God. I bear witness that Muhammed is the Messenger 
of God.’)”). 
105 Id. at 1843. 
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to empathize with the position the Town of Greece has put that dissenter in: 
Perhaps she feels sufficient pressure to go along—to rise, bow her 
head, and join in whatever others are saying: After all, she wants, very 
badly, what the judge or poll worker or immigration official has to 
offer. Or perhaps she is made of stronger mettle, and she opts not to 
participate in what she does not believe—indeed, what would, for her, 
be something like blasphemy. She then must make known her dissent 
from the common religious view, and place herself apart from other 
citizens, as well as from the officials responsible for the invocations.106
In this extended exercise in imagination, Justice Kagan entreats her 
audience to a reading of the Establishment Clause that evokes all of the 
virtues we are discussing. First, she asks the Court’s audience to exercise 
compassion, to “walk with” the religious dissenter as she both feels the 
sting of rejection and decides the course of least damage in responding to it. 
Second, she hints that a reading of the Establishment Clause should go 
beyond what might be “due” the religious dissenter under the Court’s 
existing precedents such as Marsh v. Chambers107 or its doctrines such as 
the anti-coercion rule championed by Justices Scalia and Kennedy.108
Moreover, hers is not the argument about protecting religious 
idiosyncrasy or autonomy we have seen in other Religion Clause cases such 
as Prince. Rather, she suggests that what is at stake is the relational nature 
of our polity, the relationship of citizens to each other: 
What the circumstances here demand is the recognition that we are a 
pluralistic people too. When citizens of all faiths come to speak to each 
other and their elected representatives in a legislative session, the 
government must take especial care to ensure that the prayers they hear 
will seek to include, rather than serve to divide. No more is required—
but that much is crucial—to treat every citizen, of whatever religion, as 
an equal participant in her government.109
Indeed, like our women plaintiffs in the Free Exercise cases, she not 
only bids her fellow citizens to recognize their bond with the religious 
dissenters they are excluding by these practices, but offers, in a spirit of 
compromise, “None of this means that Greece’s town hall must be religion- 
or prayer-free.”110 Officials simply must take “especial care” to include 
every citizen as an equally valuable citizen.111
106 Id. at 1844. 
107  463 U.S. 783 (1946). 
108 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
109 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1850. 
110 Id.
111 Id.
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In making this argument, Justice Kagan takes up an arguably feminist 
constitutional position embracing contextuality, compassion, generosity, 
and integrity that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor first took in Lynch v. 
Donnelly.112 Like Justice Kagan, in Lynch, Justice O’Connor insisted on 
going farther into contextual review than even the Lemon formula,113 which 
asks for an “on-the-ground” review of government officials’ intentions as 
well as the consequence of their actions and their “entanglement” with 
religion.114 In her formulation of what has come to be known as the non-
endorsement principle in Lynch and County of Allegheny, both involving 
crèches on public land Justice O’Connor called for an approach that is 
highly attuned to the relationships and situation posed by Establishment 
Clause cases: “[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”115 Moreover, she notes later, that judgment must 
include the “‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice . . . because it provides part 
of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a 
challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement 
of religion.”116
The other women Justices have followed her in making this demand 
for a contextual approach to religious dissenter claims. For example, Justice 
Sotomayor’s recent concurring opinion in the recent Holt v. Hobbs 
decision, protecting a Muslim prisoner’s right to wear a short beard under 
RLUIPA, notes, “Nothing in the Court’s opinion calls into question our 
prior holding in Cutter v. Wilkinson that ‘[c]ontext matters’ in the applica-
tion of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA).”117 Her opinion itself relies on Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in 
Cutter, which similarly notes the importance of a contextual approach, 
involving the concerns of both parties, in reading of a RLUIPA claim: 
“While the Act adopts a ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard . . . 
‘[c]ontext matters’ in the application of that standard.”118
112  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
113  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
114  Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s description of the Lemon test skews toward the relational and 
contextual. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 393 
(1999) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615), she claims that Lemon “requires examination of ‘the character 
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.’” 
115  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 624–25 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
694).
116  Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (quoting 
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630). 
117  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015). 
118  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–23 (2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
327 (2003)). 
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Second, in Lynch and County of Allegheny, Justice O’Connor has also 
demanded that the constitutionality of a government religious display be 
judged through an exercise of compassionate understanding of how these 
displays’ messages affect the political self-understanding of the most 
vulnerable of citizens. For “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”119
Justice O’Connor has followed this theme in her few Free Exercise 
opinions as well. In her Smith concurrence, she twice calls out the 
importance of a compassionate review by the Court and the state about how 
the government’s laws affect minorities.120 Once again, she echoes the 
theme that this review must be highly contextual with respect to the 
individual believer’s situation-the Court must  
apply this test in each case to determine whether the burden on the 
specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether 
the particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is 
compelling. Even if, as an empirical matter, a government’s criminal 
laws might usually serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or 
public order, the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case 
determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular 
claim.121
Moreover, Justice O’Connor argues that the state must both see and 
respect the non-political harm it has caused to particular believers in Free 
Exercise cases, even in those cases where it must reluctantly decide to apply 
the law anyway. As she puts it in Smith, “the essence of a free exercise 
claim is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious practices 
or beliefs . . . laws that, in effect, make abandonment of one’s own religion 
or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in 
119  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); County of 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573, 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
120  Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).
121 Id. at 899 (emphases added). In her interesting dissent in Hernandez v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 710–11 (1989), Justice O’Connor employed the same technique used 
by Justice Kagan in Town of Greece to demand that the Court, and the reader, put themselves in the 
shoes of a Scientologist: “Neither has [the IRS] explained why the benefit received by a Christian who 
obtains the pew of his or her choice by paying a rental fee, a Jew who gains entrance to High Holy Day 
services by purchasing a ticket, a Mormon who makes the fixed payment necessary for a temple 
recommend, or a Catholic who pays a Mass stipend, is incidental to the real benefit conferred on the 
‘general public and members of the faith,’ . . . while the benefit received by a Scientologist from 
auditing is a personal accommodation” which is not tax deductible. 
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the civil community.”122 She moreover notes the “harsh impact majoritarian 
rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Amish.”123 Justice Ginsburg strikes a similar 
chord in interpreting RLUIPA in the Cutter case, noting how the law 
“protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their 
religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission 
and accommodation for exercise of their religion.”124
This demand for the government to really see the religious dissenter 
and care what the law is doing to her is described in other ways in the 
female Justices’ opinions. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor similarly reject 
the right of the government to turn a blind eye to the harms it causes when 
it requires religious dissenters to conform to secular law. In Cutter, for 
example, Justice Ginsburg notes that “government need not ‘be oblivious to 
impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious 
belief and practice.’”125 Rather, under RLUIPA, “courts must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.”126 Similarly, in Hobbs, Justice Sotomayor notes that 
judicial deference to prison administrators’ experience “does not extend so 
far that prison officials may declare a compelling governmental interest by 
fiat.”127
The rhetoric of the Smith majority opinion clearly favors the argument 
that religion is an individualistic preference and that the religious dissenter 
is eccentric and subversive, echoing the Court’s opinions in cases like 
Prince and Barnette. These dissenting beliefs, Justice Scalia argues, citing 
Justice Frankfurter in Gobitis, “contradict the relevant concerns of a 
political society” and thus do “not relieve the citizen from the discharge of 
political responsibilities.”128 Permitting religious exemptions unless there is 
122 Smith, 494 U.S. at 897 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which a Native American father objected to the possible spirit-destroying 
attachment of a Social Security number to his daughter’s record, Justice O’Connor opined, “[o]nly an 
especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a 
sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Id. at 728 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In this case, Justice O’Connor’s skepticism about a Smith-type law of neutral applicability rule is 
similarly grounded in the importance of looking contextually at the precise burden or conflict of 
loyalties imposed upon a religious minority citizen. 
123 Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
124  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). 
125 Id. at 720 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 
705 (1994)). 
126 Id.
127  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Yellowbear 
v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 59 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
128 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 
594–595 (1940)). 
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a compelling state interest, he argues, would permit a religious believer “to 
become a law unto himself,”129 and to “ignore generally applicable laws.”130
The possibility that the believer is making a conscientious choice out of a 
relationship with God and other persons does not seem within the realm of 
Justice Scalia’s imagination about religious dissent. 
Rather than suggesting that religious liberty is principally for the 
eccentric, the women Justices call for respect for the role of religion in the 
life of believers and the community. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Smith insists that “an individual’s free exercise of religion is a preferred 
constitutional activity,” not an anomaly.131 In City of Boerne, she 
underscores this point historically by discussing at length Madison’s 
concern that early drafts of the Free Exercise Clause using the term 
“toleration” wrongly suggested that “the right to practice one’s religion was 
a governmental favor, rather than an inalienable liberty.”132
These women Justices also understand the importance of religious 
dissenters’ ability to be faithful and constant to the relationships in their 
lives. In Justice O’Connor’s argument for a robust Free Exercise regime in 
Smith, she honors the virtue of integrity by asking that the state not insist 
that religious believers abandon their commitments to each other and to 
their God as a price of honoring their citizenship commitments to their 
neighbors and the authorities.133 The standard test that the Smith Court 
propounds refuses to consider the terrible bind in which a uniform law with 
no exceptions or contextualization places the citizen who wants to be 
faithful to both God and country. 
The Free Exercise cases where women are plaintiffs are but a subset of 
these cases—all Lillian Gobitis, Lucie McClure, Frieda Yoder and the rest 
are asking is that they be allowed to meet commitments to both sets of 
relationships. By contrast to the Smith ruling, in her lengthy historical 
dissent in City of Boerne calling for a review of the Smith decision, Justice 
129 Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–167 (1878)). 
130 Id at 886. Certainly, there is other language in this opinion which contradicts the 
individualistic understanding of religious dissent. For example, Justice Scalia quotes Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1963), noting that uniform application of general laws to religious dissenters 
is important “[p]recisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every 
conceivable religious preference,’ . . . and precisely because we value and protect that religious 
divergence.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Similarly, Justice Scalia grudgingly accepts that there is a cost to 
religious dissenters, albeit in his view an acceptable cost: “Accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each 
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs.” Id. at 890. 
131 Id. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
132  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 555 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
133  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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O’Connor notes that the very exemptions sought by believers such as Adell 
Sherbert and Lillian Gobitis were historically granted to religious 
dissenters, whether it was the requirement that they take an oath, or an 
exemption from military conscription.134 Despite the high public cost, she 
notes, the Founders recognized the importance of respecting religious 
conscience.135 Moreover, she cites with approval not simply an individualist 
argument for Free Exercise, but Madison’s own relational argument that 
tracks the religious concerns of gratitude and humility: 
This right is . . . unalienable; [both] because the opinions of [peo-
ple] . . . cannot follow the dictates of other[s] . . . [and it entails] a duty 
towards the Creator. This duty is precedent both in order of time and 
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. [E]very man who 
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, [must] do it with a 
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.136
To Madison, then, duties to God were superior to duties to civil autho-
rities—the ultimate loyalty was owed to God above all. 
The importance of integrity in the relationship of the religious believer 
with the world is evidenced as much in Justice O’Connor’s opinions 
upholding the state’s regulation as those where she would overturn it. In 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, for example, she contrasts the imposition of a 
sales tax on a large religious corporation’s income with previous license 
taxes imposed by municipalities on evangelizers seeking donations: 
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of 
missionary evangelism . . . utilized today on a large scale by various 
religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands upon 
thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win 
adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it is more than 
distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its 
purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious 
activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as 
do worship in the churches and preaching in the pulpits.137
Thus, Justice O’Connor makes the very argument that Sarah Prince made: 
the street is my church, and the people to whom I provide tracts for a 
donation are those I am called to serve. 
At the same time, we continue to see the women Justices’ recognition 
that there is room for compromise between the state and the believer, that 
134 Flores, 521 U.S. at 534 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 539. 
136 Id. (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184–85 (G. Hunt ed.1901)). 
137  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 385 (1990) (quoting 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1943)). 
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the right to religious dissent is not an absolute right. In Cutter, Justice 
Ginsburg cites the compromise-laden “room for play in the joints” 
phrase.138 In Holt, Justice Sotomayor emphasizes that the right to protection 
for religious exercise must be judged as “relative” and does not impose an 
impossible burden on the state to “refute every conceivable option to satisfy 
RLUIPA’s least restrictive means requirement” or “prove that they 
considered less restrictive alternatives at a particular point in time.”139
Justice Ginsburg similarly argues in Cutter, “[w]e have no cause to believe 
that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with 
particular sensitivity to security concerns.”140
IV. TOWARD A RELIGIOUS FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
In light of the themes we see being expressed by the women Justices 
on the Court on Religion Clause issues, we might take some tentative steps 
toward what rule of law for Free Exercise jurisprudence a religious feminist 
might propose. It should be one that accounts for the feminist focus on 
contextuality and relationality, as well as reflecting the particular human 
values that religious feminists would highlight: those of gratitude, humility, 
compassion, generosity, and integrity. To make an easy start, such a 
principle would no doubt look a lot more like the Sherbert test than the 
Smith rule, but we might ask whether it is possible to articulate something 
more specific than Sherbert yields. 
First, like the practice of women justices that we have been discussing, 
such a rule would eschew automatic judicial deference to uniform rules of 
law, whether they are legislative or judge-made. Instead, judges would take 
an active role in probing the concrete context in which a religious believer 
asserted a Free Exercise claim. Such a first step does not mean there would 
be no deference to legislators or administrators. For example, it may be 
clear from the legislative history or even the language of a statute or 
regulation that the legislature or executive has carefully considered just 
such a case as the religious dissenter has filed. When a legislature has 
respectfully considered the harm posed to religious believers by a uniform 
rule and expressly concluded, with findings of fact, that the harm to others 
in the state clearly outweighs the harm to religious believers, a court may 
defer to those findings of fact and conclusions if they are consistent with the 
evidence before the court. The rhetoric and practice of judicial deference in 
these circumstances would reflect not the rigid claims of jurisdictional 
138  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005). 
139  Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 867, 868 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
140 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. 
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incompetence of the judiciary,141 but active engagement with the 
circumstances coupled with the judicial humility that sounds in rhetoric of 
self-restraint.
Second, such a rule would assume that religious plaintiffs have a right 
to be fully heard on their claim of conscience, as a matter of showing 
respect for their situation and their particular dilemmas. The values of 
compassion and generosity require no less. If such a hearing took the form 
of a traditional trial before a judge, a feminist reading of the Free Exercise 
Clause would suggest that the courts be reasonably generous in permitting 
religious litigants to introduce evidence about the nature of their religious 
belief and why the legal compulsion they are resisting would cause a true 
conflict of conscience. 
The courts have been somewhat uneven in granting religious litigants a 
full hearing. On one hand, in the Central American sanctuary cases and in 
civil disobedience cases protesting nuclear or foreign policy, some courts 
have been rigid in blocking introduction of evidence regarding plaintiff’s 
religious beliefs.142 On the other, many of the Supreme Court Free Exercise 
cases have involved fairly robust presentations of evidence about religious 
beliefs that force a crisis of conscience when believers are being coerced to 
act against conscience. As just two examples of the latter, the Court allowed 
significant evidence about Amish religious beliefs and historical interaction 
with the outside world in Wisconsin v. Yoder143 and in Lyng v. Northwest 
Cemetery Association,144 a similarly fulsome presentation of evidence about 
141  Scholars have made a good case for a jurisdictional reading of the Religion Clauses, 
including an argument about its compatibility with theological claims that may have motivated the 
drafters. See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
(2014). The jurisdictional approach brings a commendable level of certainty to the problem of who has 
authority to make decisions about religious exercise. However, its drawback is precisely that rigidity and 
clarity, which may not respect unique contextual factors that call for a better balance of judicial inquiry 
and self-restraint. 
142 See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of 
Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 952–62 (1995) (discussing recalcitrance of judges to 
permit Sanctuary movement defendants to introduce evidence about their religious reasons for sheltering 
Central American refugees); William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: 
Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 3, 33–34, 54–55, 65 (2003) (comparing cases in which the 
jury was allowed to hear religious claims of defendants arguing necessity in nuclear weapon cases and 
Sanctuary and other cases where the courts refused such testimony); Felton Davis, Civil Disobedience 
and the Law, WARISACRIME.ORG (Mar. 2013), warisacrime.org/sites/afterdowningstreet.org/files/
cdandlaw.pdf (describing civil disobedience cases such as United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 
(4th Cir. 1969), in which defendants were permitted to introduce some evidence regarding their religious 
beliefs, as well as cases such as United States v. Montgomery (the “Pershing Plowshares” case), 772 
F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985), in which prosecutors successfully excluded evidence regarding religious 
beliefs and defenses such as necessity). 
143  For a summary of this evidence, see Brief for the Peititoner at 15–17, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70–110), 1971 WL 126407, at *15–17. 
144  For a summary of these claims, see Brief for the Petitioners at 2–14, Lyng v. Northwest 
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Native American beliefs about sacred lands. 
One objection to the introduction of religious evidence in Free 
Exercise cases may be that trials will drag on, creating an inefficient use of 
court resources, and records will become riddled with irrelevant evidence. 
However, such evidence certainly is not irrelevant to one of the consistent 
questions that the courts ask in Free Exercise cases—i.e., whether the 
defendant sincerely identifies a conflict between his religious beliefs and 
the state’s demands. Moreover, to the extent that a Free Exercise case has 
the value of illuminating minority religions’ difficulties with majoritarian 
laws that unwittingly or thoughtlessly impose severe constraints on 
minority religionists, a trial record can serve as public education about the 
nature of these conflicts, which is one of the values of public trials 
themselves.145 Moreover, good trial judges can manage requests to 
introduce evidence in ways that permit both fulsome and efficient creation 
of a record, putting pressure on litigants to eliminate redundancy and to 
sharpen their central religious claims and the evidence supporting them. 
Beyond efficiency and relevance concerns, there may be some concern 
that permitting religious litigants to introduce religious evidence risks the 
possibility that judges will make religious judgments—e.g., that a defendant 
is not sincere because his version of his religion does not square with 
others’ version of what his religion requires, or that one sect or school of a 
particular religion represents the “true” theology in such a religion.146 While 
such a concern is valid, it is not inevitably true that presentation of religious 
evidence results in impermissible theological fact-finding by courts. That a 
court agrees to hear religious claims as a matter of compassion and 
generosity does not automatically require a court to pass on the objective 
validity or centrality of such claims. 
Third, the Court needs to re-interpret or perhaps re-invent the language 
of “compelling” in the compelling state interest test if that is the starting 
point for a feminist-inspired reading of the Free Exercise Clause. As it has 
been interpreted in the Free Exercise cases, the term “compelling” has been 
given a range of interpretations from “subordinating” i.e., more important 
than the interest of the plaintiffs when those interest are balanced, to “of 
overriding importance” (also a comparative term, but suggesting an interest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013), 987 WL 880342, at *2–14. 
145  Richmond News v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (quoting State v. Schmit, N.W.2d 
800, 807 (Minn. 1966)) (noting “[i]t is not unrealistic even in this day to believe that public inclusion 
affords citizens a form of legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration 
of justice”); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966). 
146 See Marie A. Failinger, United States v. Ballard, in LAW AND RELIGION CASES IN CONTEXT
41–42 (Aspen Press, Leslie Griffin ed., 2010). 
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of great concern to the state).147
As just one example, courts hearing free exercise claims have found 
non-compelling the state’s claimed interests “to avoid the widespread 
unemployment and the consequent burden on the fund resulting if people 
were permitted to leave jobs for ‘personal’ reasons; and to avoid a detailed 
probing by employers into job applicants’ religious beliefs,”148 while 
finding compelling a “public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,” 
free of “myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious 
beliefs.”149
Closer attention to the word itself, “compelling” may hold a key. It 
differs from other descriptors used to describe important state interests, 
such as “weighty” or “substantial”150 in that it is a rhetorical rather than a 
metaphysical descriptor. It does not require the Court to create a priority list 
for the legislature about which interests—for example, national security or 
violence—should carry more weight than other interests—for example, 
administrative convenience. Rather, to “compel” in this circumstance means 
to convince a decision-maker that the state has made its case for the refusal 
to waive the applicability of the law to a particular Free Exercise case. 
Thus, the term need not imply that the test is almost always “fatal in fact”151
because it requires an impossibly weighty interest of the state. Rather, in 
reality, the Court’s actions have resembled the descriptions of strict scrutiny 
as a “balancing” test between the individual’s and the state’s interests,152
147 Lukumi Babalu Aye suggests that compelling also means comprehensive, noting that if the 
government “fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or 
alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. It is 
established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that ‘a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 
“‘of the highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.’” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
148  Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981). 
149  Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1981). 
150 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) 
(describing the compelling state interest in remedying past or present racial discrimination as “a 
sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative 
action program”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that the University’s 
compelling interest in educational diversity as implemented by “its critical mass idea, which creates 
‘substantial’ educational benefits”). 
151  See Justice O’Connor’s similar point in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
237 (1995). 
152 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 569 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (discussing the Court’s precedents that were “illustrative of the general 
nature of free-exercise protections and the delicate balancing required by our decisions in 
[Sherbert and Yoder] when an important state interest is shown”). Indeed, in Burwell, the Court 
suggested that, “RFRA did more than merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases; 
it provided even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those decisions.” 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 n.3 (2014). 
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one that that initially puts the thumb on the scales of the religious 
individual; or those that suggest that the state is being put to its proof that it 
has deeply considered and studied how it will effectuate its interests.153
However, if we must think of the compelling state interest test as a 
balance—and the question of whether the state’s interest “overrides” the 
plaintiff’s, or vice-versa—that balance can only be properly calculated if 
the nature of the plaintiff’s interest is adequately accounted for. This is 
particularly true in cases where the plaintiff is being required to violate her 
conscience and invade the integrity of her relationships with other persons 
and communities of which she is a part. Those cases such as Smith that 
imply that claims of conscience are personal predilections154 miss the mark, 
because they do not rest on adequate scholarly accounts of the way in which 
conscience is formed and how it is different from merely personal 
preference.155
Thus, taking the time to listen to a plaintiff describe the trajectory of 
religious experience which has led her to the conclusion that, like Sarah 
Prince, she must obey God rather than men and according that belief full 
respect is critical to this endeavor. The value of compassion suggests that 
both government and the courts that hear religious exemption cases must be 
well enough acquainted with the dilemma facing religious objectors that 
they can grasp, at least in its essence, what is at stake in the minds of such 
believers. 
At the same time, in conditions of sin, both governments and the 
courts who hear these cases need to be prepared, if absolutely necessary, to 
interrogate religious believers about whether their “sincere religious belief” 
is a matter of personal whim or darker personal motivations such as racism 
or homophobia. Most religious dissenters who have succeeded in their 
claims (and many who have not) can describe in detail an honest and 
reasoned position from within the religious or spiritual tradition which they 
claim has called them to disobey the secular law.156 They are not relying on 
153 See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 (citing the lack of evidence to support the state’s interest). 
154  Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (in which Justice 
Scalia’s remark excoriating a Free Exercise regime that would permit an individual to become “a law 
unto himself” essentially equates conscience claims with refusals to obey the law for idiosyncratic 
personal reasons). 
155 See Marie A. Failinger, “No More Deaths”: On Conscience, Civil Disobedience, and a New 
Role for Truth Commissions, 75 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 401, 421–25 (2007) (describing medieval Catholic 
and Lutheran views of the operation of the conscience). 
156 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (describing history of Amish 
religion and reasons for refusal to attend school); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439–40 (1971) 
(describing conscientious objection based on centuries of Catholic just war theory); Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503. 510 nn.1, 2 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing Goldman’s request 
to wear yarmulke based on Orthodox Jewish custom and belief); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 459–62 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing longstanding 
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a “gut hunch” or an emotional reaction to the state’s law to justify their 
claims. 
We must be candid about the risks here: such an interrogation risks the 
specter of judges making improper theological conclusions about the 
validity of dissenters’ claims, and possibly judging some claims as not 
religious or spiritual because believers cannot point to a long-standing, 
well-documented tradition of religious thought to support their positions. 
Justice Jackson, speaking in Ballard, correctly warned of the possibility that 
judges’ and juries’ unwillingness to accept the objective truth of a religious 
claimant’s statement will color their assessment of whether that claimant is 
sincere in his belief or an imposter.157 And, the Court in Thomas v. Review 
Board reminds that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, con-
sistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.”158
Nevertheless, reserving the possibility of such a test in the most 
extreme cases where the religious claimant cannot articulate any basis for 
his or her belief may be necessary to avoid Justice Scalia’s “parade of 
horribles” suggesting that religious belief may be used as a cloak to hide 
behind anarchic and idiosyncratic exercises that “thumb their nose” at the 
authority of the state.159 However, employing the value of integrity as 
constancy in one’s own character and constancy to others, courts can look 
for a course of past action in the religious dissenter as someone who has 
taken responsibility for her actions and her future in relationship to others in 
the community.160
A constitutional focus on a “compelling” interest also implies, 
consistent with the values of humility and compassion, that the government 
present actual evidence about its conclusion that a uniform rule is so 
significant that it must be applied to plaintiffs in order to effectuate the 
offered state interest. Humility as a value requires that one be prepared to 
acknowledge one’s own limitations. For the state, one of those limitations 
in promulgating laws is limited information about how such laws will affect 
its constituencies, both now and in the future. A government that has acted 
on the basis of limited and thus flawed knowledge about the nature of the 
burdens that its citizens carry should be prepared to correct mistakes it may 
have made based on faulty and incomplete information. 
Conversely, a government that has overstated the interest it has in 
regulating citizens generally should be prepared to acknowledge that it has 
Native religious beliefs about sacred lands). 
157  Failinger, United States v. Ballard, supra note 146, at 42–43. 
158 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. 
159 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902. 
160 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
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overreached, and that it need not have regulated in some subset, or perhaps 
most subsets, of cases governed by its reach. We might look to some of the 
Court’s Speech Clause cases to set a properly high standard for courts in 
putting the state to its proof that its laws reflect a well-researched and well-
reasoned and focused, i.e., narrowly tailored, approach to the evils they are 
attempting to eradicate.161 The Free Exercise Clause demands no less. 
To avoid Justice Jackson’s concern that judges and juries might 
discount a plaintiff’s sincerity because of their disbelief about her claims, 
the value of compassion suggests that the decision-maker be trained to be 
capable of walking in the shoes of the religious plaintiff, at least minimally. 
The value of compassion requires that any government decision-maker seek 
to understand at a very basic level why a religious plaintiff would consider 
the duties of her faith to so gravely implicate her salvation or her intrinsic 
moral integrity that she would be willing to violate the secular law and face 
the consequences before giving that up. Again, we might call upon Justice 
O’Connor’s Religion Clause cases to articulate what the nature of the 
compelling state interest test might mean in religious test cases. She has 
suggested that a judge may and must make a judgment about whether the 
state has trenched upon Establishment Clause concerns using a “collective 
standard to gauge ‘the “objective” meaning of the [government’s] statement 
in the community.’”162 Thus, the judge must be the “personification of a 
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] 
social judgment.”163 The “reasonable observer . . . must be deemed aware of 
the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious 
display appears.”164 This call would seem to implicate the need for the 
decision-maker to have a basic understanding of the religious plurality of 
his or her community coupled with the curiosity and willingness to learn 
more from litigants about their traditions. 
The value of humility suggests that courts should be more prepared to 
constitutionally “bless” regulatory schemes potentially trenching on Free 
Exercise rights if they contain procedures for seeking waivers or 
exemptions when a law is inaptly applied to religious believers. Recall how 
Justice Scalia characterized the unemployment benefits process as 
anomalous for First Amendment law because it permits religious believers, 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 821–22 (2000) (dissecting 
paucity of evidence for a restriction on adult-oriented TV); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 
(1993) (dissecting inadequate evidence of effectuation of the state’s interest even in a commercial 
speech case); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 667 (1993) (dissecting the inadequate evidence 
and inferences in a commercial speech case). 
162  Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995). 
163 Id. at 780. 
164 Id.
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like others, to bring evidence and receive individualized determinations that 
the “seeking work” or “good cause” termination rules of those systems were 
not justly applied to them.165
Instead of considering the unemployment cases as aberrant exceptions 
and cases like Smith with its uniform and apparently unconsidered law 
treating all drugs in all settings the same as the norm, the Court should be 
holding up laws that have exemption processes as desirable examples of 
how constitutional laws should be written. Similarly, states that adopt 
general religious exemption laws166 that permit courts to consider context-
driven exemptions from all or some large subset of state statutes should be 
praised, not condemned, for carving out the opportunity for religious 
believers to present a valid defense. The recent rash of attacks on “little-
RFRA” statutes being introduced in state legislatures in the wake of the rise 
of same-sex marriage167 has perhaps made for good political theater about 
important equality values, but the demise of these statutes in the wake of 
these isolated controversies makes for bad constitutional law. Waiver and 
exemption statutes do not certainly spell the end to non-discrimination or 
other important laws; they simply give religious dissenters the opportunity 
to make a case for why the laws should not be applied to them, a case which 
needs to be more fulsome and compelling than “it just seems wrong to me.” 
Crafting these statutes, however, may require more than simply 
mimicking Sherbert v. Verner. Such statutes, without at least specific 
direction to administrative bodies about how to implement them,168 risk the 
165 See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
166  For a listing of the twenty-three current state “little-RFRA” laws, see, State Religious 
Freedom Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2015), and for the current status of 2015 
legislation, see State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
167 See, e.g., Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Governor Signs Amended 
“Religious Freedom” Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 pm), www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/70819106. The case of 
Indiana’s little-RFRA illustrates how lack of contextual attention to all of the public interests involved 
and the resulting lack of careful tailoring can leave room for questions about whether religious 
dissenters are entitled to engage in actions that violate the human rights of others. As a result of the 
public controversy surrounding its law, controversy that probably would not have erupted but for a 
national basketball tournament, Indiana amended its RFRA to exclude refusals to provide services or 
goods to the public based on sexual orientation or a number of other disadvantaged groups. 
168   For various examples of state statutory religious freedom exemptions, see Daniel O. Conkle,
Free Exercise, Federalism and the States as Laboratories, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 493, 496–98 (1999). 
Professor Conkle describes several alternatives. For example, a legislative study committee or 
administrative regulations might craft “specifically defined religious exemptions for particular legal 
contexts.” A state “might provide a more lenient standard of scrutiny in certain contexts, such as 
prisons,” or a law might define “more precisely what constitutes a prima facie claim for relief,” by 
defining substantial burden and exercise of religion. A state might be more specific about what a 
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same a-contextual approach insensitive to the needs of those who may 
suffer harm because of a religious exemption that a blanket “neutral, 
generally applicable” statute risks to these believers. 
Finally, the value of humility expects the state to have considered 
alternatives in light of the possible harm to be caused to its religious 
citizens by the law. Again, the Court has been unclear exactly what the 
terms “narrowly tailored” or “least restrictive alternative” mean in the 
context of protecting religious expression. In recent years, the Court claims 
to have moved from an extreme understanding of these terms, i.e., holding 
the state must design the most narrow statute humanly conceivable. Instead, 
it has tended to invalidate only those statutes that are breathtakingly 
overbroad and do not significantly advance the state’s purported interest. 
Yet, neither a “substantial overbreadth” nor an “absolutely no 
alternatives” definition of narrow tailoring appropriately applies to religious 
freedom cases. A religious adherent who is forced to violate her conscience 
is not comforted by the fact that a law is narrowly designed to regulate only 
a small class of people, including her. Nor does her problem go away if the 
state can show that it chose an alternative which least restricts the most 
freedom, if it still violates her conscience. Rather, the Court’s formulation 
that a restriction of her religion must be really “necessary” in order to 
achieve the state’s important and convincing interest properly respects the 
delicate balance between freedom of conscience and the state’s need to use 
law as a means to serve the community. 
Thus, if we had to formulate a religious feminist reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause into a usable principle of law, it might read something like 
this: When the court faces a religious plaintiff who sincerely believes that 
her faith requires her to violate the law, the court must be convinced that, 
given the history and context of the plaintiff’s belief and the state’s 
promulgation of the law, the state has either (a) provided for a robust 
process for exempting a plaintiff from enforcement of the law, one which 
allows her to make a full case for her religious objection before a well-
informed and neutral decision maker, such as an administrative law judge; 
or (b) fully considered and documented, in its legislative history, that 
application of the law to the plaintiff and those like her is necessary in order 
“compelling” interest is (i.e., prevention of direct harms to specific parties or to public health, safety, 
etc.), or when the state has offered a “least restrictive means” to further it. A state might craft a law that 
provides different standards of scrutiny for “core” religious acts such as worship or religious rituals, and 
another standard for conscientious objection to laws. Eugene Volokh has suggested a different approach: 
permitting courts to use the tradition of religious freedom jurisprudence in the United States to make a 
“common law” of religious exemptions coupled with specific legislative and executive agency 
exemptions instantiated in law, with the burden of justification on the government if there is no evidence 
of a legislative exemption from the religious freedom law, Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for 
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1503–04 (1999). 
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to effectuate its state interest; or (c) shown the court, by clear and 
compelling evidence, that it is necessary to regulate religious believers 
whose exercise is substantially burdened to achieve the state’s interest, and 
that the state’s interest is compelling enough to override the plaintiff’s 
exercise of her religious beliefs, given the full context of the state’s 
application of its law to individual plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, it is possible to hear, albeit dimly, “a woman’s 
voice” in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence, both in the 
actions of women litigants in these cases, and more clearly, the language 
that the women justices use to articulate how the Free Exercise Clause 
should be interpreted. These litigants’ actions and these justices’ opinions 
call for a careful evaluation of the context in which religious freedom 
conflicts arise by a decision-maker who is well-versed in the history of his 
or her community, including its religious diversity. The women justices also 
call for a respectful hearing of the stories of religious dissenters, one that, if 
not fully empathetic, at least attempts to “walk a mile” in the shoes of such 
believers in an attempt to understand why they feel obliged to refuse the 
state obedience to particular laws. A feminist reading of the Free Exercise 
Clause thus emphasizes the importance of a fully contextual and relational 
perspective on religious freedom conflicts. 
As these arguments of the justices suggest, in a religious feminist 
reading, the Constitution calls legislatures, executives and courts to respond 
to the reality of religious minorities in their midst by exercising those 
virtues the Constitution should embody. The Free Exercise Clause should 
be read to effectuate the vision of those Founders who understood religious 
liberty as a blessing, and were willing to protect the liberty of all, religious 
and secular, in gratitude for that blessing.169
169 See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.
html (noting that “[w]hilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the 
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose 
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an 
offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered” 
and closing with the prayer that “the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom 
it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their Councils from every act which would affront his holy 
prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other, guide them into every measure 
which may be worthy of his blessing, may redound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly 
the liberties, the prosperity and the happiness of the Commonwealth.”). See the Preamble to the 1870 
Constitution of the State of Illinois, ILL. CONST. pmbl., beginning “We, the People of the State of 
Illinois—grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty which He has permitted us 
to enjoy and seeking His blessing upon our endeavors . . . ” and other state constitution preambles. See
State Preambles, E REFERENCE DESK, www.ereferencedesk.com/resources/state-preambles (last visited 
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By asking the state to consider the plight of religious minorities, these 
justices essentially ask for the law to demonstrate compassion and 
generosity to religious groups and individuals who are powerless to effect 
majoritarian protection on their own. Such virtues require that government 
respect these minorities by giving careful attention to the stories of religious 
dissenters. They also call for serious and concrete self-reflection, borne out 
of the virtue of humility, on whether the state has truly considered the plight 
of religious minorities in its decision-making process, according their 
dilemmas of conscience value equal to those accorded majority believers. 
When that consideration has not been a significant part of the legislative 
process, the value of humility also requires the state to re-consider whether 
believers’ requests for an exemption from generally applicable laws due to 
conflicts of conscience may be granted without serious damage to the 
state’s interests. While there are no shortcuts to handle assertions of 
religious freedom claims, the Constitution and the experiment in religious 
liberty that it has fostered require no less. 
Sept. 7, 2015). 
